888888888
Toothed whales (Odontocetes)
echolocate by creating a series of clicks emitted at various frequencies. Sound
pulses are emitted through their melon-shaped forehead, reflected off objects,
and retrieved through the lower jaw. Skulls of Squalodon show evidence for the
first appearance of echolocation. Squalodons lived from the early to middle Oligocene
to the middle Miocene, around 33-14 million years ago. A peculiar blend of
archaic and modern features characterize Squalodon. The cranium was well
compressed, the rostrum telescoped outward, giving an appearance of modern
toothed whales. However, it is thought unlikely that squalodontids have
anything to do with the ancestry of most living dolphins.
http://louis-j-sheehan.us/Blog/blog.aspx
http://www.amazon.com/Struggle-for-Vicksburg/dp/B000EM6XDM/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1198168389&sr=1-1
99999
I was
the one who put Meigs in second place! At least my thinking seems to be
consistent!
best
Keith
My vague
recollection is that a recent article asked various current-
day
scholars to list their opinions as to the most influential ACW
Generals,
and one (maybe two?) scholar(s) suggested -- I think the
name was
-- Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs which nomination
stood
out from the pack. Your replies seem to buttress how critical
well-managed
supply lines were to the efforts.
-- Lou
Louis,
Will see
what I can do about the article -- I like the idea. I remember your name
from the 3W days too. As for Vicksburg, there was a short stretch of
railroad on the west bank, and this facilitated getting goods to the
river, and of course Vicksburg itself was connected with Jackson and
points east by rail. So Vicksburg was a better place at which to ship
goods to and from. You are right, occupying the west bank would have cut
this. Goods were crossed at other points, but presumably in much smaller
quantities and with much delay, and the ever-present threat of Union
gunboats. With Vicksburg as a base, the navy would (I presume) become
more effective (I am assuming, for example, that ships could take on coal
there).
Also,
the capture of Vicksburg rendered it Unecessary to keep a force on the
west bank opposite the city that had to be supplied by land.
best
wishes
Keith
Sir --
Thank
you for your very prompt and informative reply. Might I ask for one
clarification (I can read whatever response you have in the magazine if
you are so inclined)?
With
Vicksburg standing, was the Rebel cross-river (shore to shore) transport of
goods -- say salt -- and men almost entirely limited to a small corridor
in the shadow of Vicksburg itself, and, assuming so, was such cross-river
traffic therefore safe from Union interference? If there was one
small corridor, then it would seem that cross-river traffic would have
been ended simply by occupying the bank of the river across from the city
(although such limited effort would not have resulted in the other
benefits you mentioned earlier)?
I'll
mention I recall you from the old Wargamer and S&T days. I
started wargaming in the mid-70. Life has been such that only in
the past year have I again been reading about the American Civil
War. Knowing some of your past, I'll ask another question/suggest
another possible article:
In my
own lay-person's terms, with a few notable(AHEM!) exceptions, Jeb Stuart
& Co. had the reputation of providing General Lee very good and
timely information and for providing good cavalry screens. Could we
read an article about how such scouting and screening was organized?
That is, graphs showing -- standard? -- patterns of dispersal,
amount of cavalry used to satisfy the missions, how one side would react
if it thought it might have been discovered/the other side might react if
it stumbled across apparent screening/ scouting activity? I would ask
more questions but I'm not a horse- person and should leave that up to others.
The basic point is: describe in some detail an active cavalry
screening (say a movement up/through the Shenandoah "major" or
through Maryland or from the Union point of view ) and an active
large-scale scouting mission (perhaps that by Buford at the opening of
Gettysburg or before Brandy Station or even that relating to a smaller
engagement such as the Battle of Corinth (it seems information about the
enemy was so much more lacking in the West than in the East despite the
presence of cavalry)).
Again,
many thanks,
--Lou
Louis,
I will
try to find space for your letter in the Crossfire column, and print as
close to definitive answers as we can. For now, and just for your
personal attention, here are my personal responses off the top of my
head:
1. There
wasn't exactly a "Fort Vicksburg," but the guns of the city
could pretty much rule out any Union river movement upstream, as the
current was fierce and vessels could only have made slow headway against
it, leaving them sitting ducks for a considerable length of time.
Daylight movement by anything except an armored vessel would have been
suicidal. Downstream movement would also have been hazardous (witness the
transports that ran the gauntlet on 22 April, 1863 -- I hope I got that
date right, no time to look it up right now. Effectively therefore,
movement up and down the Mississippi was blocked -- as a regular supply
route -- as long as the Confederates held Vicksburg.
2. It
wasn't critical, in the sense that it was not vital for Union
goods/supplies/men to move up or down the river. It was, however, politically
critical, for the farmers of the Mid-West wanted to be able to ship their
product down the river. Economically the importance of this had declined
before the war, with the linkage of the Mid-West to the East by railroad
(and canal). Nevertheless, the river route still loomed large in the
consciousness of those in Illinois, Missouri, Wisconsin, Iowa, etc.
3. The
Confedrates did attempt to interdict the river by placing artillery along the
shore, and moving it when threatened. However, the Union riverine vessels
and the use of marines and others to land and ravage localities used for
such operations -- and the limited effect of such artillery --
rendered this a nuisance, but not more.
4. Yes.
There was considerable cross-river traffic (west to east) prior to the
siege -- especially important was salt, used to cure meat for the eastern
armies. It wasn't the fall of Vicksburg that halted this flow of goods,
so much as the presence of the Union navy on the river. Of course, once
Vicksburg (and then Port Hudson) fell, the navy presence became that much
more effective.
5. I
don't know numbers/quantities. However, the loss of salt alone made the
supply of meat to the Army of North Virginia more problematic, and this
added significantly to Lee's logistical difficulties.
Confederate
trans-Mississippi commander Kirby Smith failed to come to the aid of
those on the eastern shore, but in any case I think his contribution
could not have been very significant. Also, the Union had enough troops
west of the Mississippi to confront the Confederates there, so probably
any long-term movement of Confederate troops across the river would have
unhinged their position west of the river.
Confederate
attacks on Union positions on the western shore of the Mississippi were
singularly unsuccessful, viz. Helena, Milliken's Bend.
Louis,
as I said, that's just off the top of my head for you. I will consult
Terry Winschel, park historian at Vicksburg, to see what he can add (for
publication) and how far he agrees with what I have said.
best
wishes,
Keith
I wrote
a quick customer review on amazon.com as below. Perhaps your magazine
(yes, I subscribe) could answer these questions? -- Lou Sheehan
Struggle
for Vicksburg (DVD Video)
A
workmanlike presentation of some of the very basic facts of the Siege. To
my disappointment, no re-enactors were used.
I?ve yet
to across a source that answers these questions that follow, so I don?t
want to imply my asking them suggests unique faults with this movie.
To what
extent could the Fort of Vicksburg inhibit Union supply river traffic
upstream and downstream (i.e., completely? 30% 70?)?
Realizing
rivers were relatively efficient ways to transport supplies (vis-à-vis
wagons and mules albeit I am not as certain as to the relative merits
between the use of rivers and railroads), how critical was it to have
?unrestricted? access to the ENTIRE river? (Recall, New Orleans was
in Union hands.)
What
would the effects have been ? and the responses to ? random/ sporadic/varying
placements of Rebel cannon along the long shoreline of the otherwise
?unrestricted? river?
By only
holding a non-besieged Vicksburg, did that allow the Rebels to
effectively transfer supplies and troops across the Misssissippi from
West to East?
Beginning
in the summer of 1863, how much material and how many troops were
effectively contained in the Western Confederacy and prohibited from
moving East? Assuming any, how much of a difference might they have made
and how? Louis J Sheehan
55555555555
Begin forwarded
message:
From: Keith Poulter <northandsouth@netptc.net>
Date: December 20, 2007 2:39:45 PM EST
To: Louis Sheehan <lousheehan@mac.com>
Subject: Re: Last
note
I was
the one who put Meigs in second place! At least my thinking seems to be
consistent!
best
Keith
-----
Original Message ----- From: "Louis Sheehan" <lousheehan@mac.com>
To:
"Keith Poulter" <northandsouth@netptc.net>
Sent:
Thursday, December 20, 2007 10:24 AM
Subject:
Last note
My vague
recollection is that a recent article asked various current-
day
scholars to list their opinions as to the most influential ACW
Generals,
and one (maybe two?) scholar(s) suggested -- I think the
name was
-- Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs which nomination
stood
out from the pack. Your replies seem to buttress how critical
well-managed
supply lines were to the efforts.
-- Lou
On Dec
20, 2007, at 12:45 PM, Keith Poulter wrote:
Louis,
Will see
what I can do about the article -- I like the idea. I remember your name
from the 3W days too. As for Vicksburg, there was a short stretch of
railroad on the west bank, and this facilitated getting goods to the
river, and of course Vicksburg itself was connected with Jackson and
points east by rail. So Vicksburg was a better place at which to ship
goods to and from. You are right, occupying the west bank would have cut
this. Goods were crossed at other points, but presumably in much smaller
quantities and with much delay, and the ever-present threat of Union
gunboats. With Vicksburg as a base, the navy would (I presume) become
more effective (I am assuming, for example, that ships could take on coal
there).
Also,
the capture of Vicksburg rendered it Unecessary to keep a force on the
west bank opposite the city that had to be supplied by land.
best
wishes
Keith
-----
Original Message ----- From: "Louis Sheehan"
<lousheehan@mac.com>
To:
<crossfire@northandsouthmagazine.com>
Cc:
<northandsouth@netptc.net>
Sent:
Thursday, December 20, 2007 7:20 AM
Subject:
Vicksburg 2
Sir --
Thank
you for your very prompt and informative reply. Might I ask for one
clarification (I can read whatever response you have in the magazine if
you are so inclined)?
With
Vicksburg standing, was the Rebel cross-river (shore to shore) transport of
goods -- say salt -- and men almost entirely limited to a small corridor
in the shadow of Vicksburg itself, and, assuming so, was such cross-river
traffic therefore safe from Union interference? If there was one
small corridor, then it would seem that cross-river traffic would have
been ended simply by occupying the bank of the river across from the city
(although such limited effort would not have resulted in the other
benefits you mentioned earlier)?
I'll
mention I recall you from the old Wargamer and S&T days. I
started wargaming in the mid-70. Life has been such that only in
the past year have I again been reading about the American Civil
War. Knowing some of your past, I'll ask another question/suggest
another possible article:
In my
own lay-person's terms, with a few notable(AHEM!) exceptions, Jeb Stuart
& Co. had the reputation of providing General Lee very good and
timely information and for providing good cavalry screens. Could we
read an article about how such scouting and screening was organized?
That is, graphs showing -- standard? -- patterns of
dispersal, amount of cavalry used to satisfy the missions, how one
side would react if it thought it might have been discovered/the
other side might react if it stumbled across apparent screening/ scouting
activity? I would ask more questions but I'm not a horse- person and
should leave that up to others. The basic point is: describe in
some detail an active cavalry screening (say a movement up/through the
Shenandoah "major" or through Maryland or from the Union point
of view ) and an active large-scale scouting mission (perhaps that by Buford at
the opening of Gettysburg or before Brandy Station or even that relating
to a smaller engagement such as the Battle of Corinth (it seems
information about the enemy was so much more lacking in the West than in
the East despite the presence of cavalry)).
Again,
many thanks,
--Lou
On
Wednesday, December 19, 2007, at 11:39PM, "Keith Poulter"
<northandsouth@netptc.net
>
wrote:
Louis,
I will
try to find space for your letter in the Crossfire column, and print as
close to definitive answers as we can. For now, and just for your
personal attention, here are my personal responses off the top of my
head:
1. There
wasn't exactly a "Fort Vicksburg," but the guns of the city
could pretty much rule out any Union river movement upstream, as the
current was fierce and vessels could only have made slow headway against
it, leaving them sitting ducks for a considerable length of time.
Daylight movement by anything except an armored vessel would have been
suicidal. Downstream movement would also have been hazardous (witness the
transports that ran the gauntlet on 22 April, 1863 -- I hope I got that
date right, no time to look it up right now. Effectively therefore,
movement up and down the Mississippi was blocked -- as a regular supply route
-- as long as the Confederates held Vicksburg.
2. It
wasn't critical, in the sense that it was not vital for Union
goods/supplies/men to move up or down the river. It was, however, politically
critical, for the farmers of the Mid-West wanted to be able to ship their
product down the river. Economically the importance of this had declined
before the war, with the linkage of the Mid-West to the East by railroad
(and canal). Nevertheless, the river route still loomed large in the
consciousness of those in Illinois, Missouri, Wisconsin, Iowa, etc.
3. The
Confedrates did attempt to interdict the river by placing artillery along the
shore, and moving it when threatened. However, the Union riverine vessels
and the use of marines and others to land and ravage localities used for
such operations -- and the limited effect of such artillery --
rendered this a nuisance, but not more.
4. Yes.
There was considerable cross-river traffic (west to east) prior to the
siege -- especially important was salt, used to cure meat for the eastern
armies. It wasn't the fall of Vicksburg that halted this flow of goods,
so much as the presence of the Union navy on the river. Of course, once
Vicksburg (and then Port Hudson) fell, the navy presence became that much
more effective.
5. I
don't know numbers/quantities. However, the loss of salt alone made the
supply of meat to the Army of North Virginia more problematic, and this
added significantly to Lee's logistical difficulties.
Confederate
trans-Mississippi commander Kirby Smith failed to come to the aid of
those on the eastern shore, but in any case I think his contribution
could not have been very significant. Also, the Union had enough troops
west of the Mississippi to confront the Confederates there, so probably
any long-term movement of Confederate troops across the river would have
unhinged their position west of the river.
Confederate
attacks on Union positions on the western shore of the Mississippi were
singularly unsuccessful, viz. Helena, Milliken's Bend.
Louis,
as I said, that's just off the top of my head for you. I will consult
Terry Winschel, park historian at Vicksburg, to see what he can add (for
publication) and how far he agrees with what I have said.
best
wishes,
Keith
-----
Original Message ----- From: Louis Sheehan
To:
crossfire@northandsouthmagazine.com
Sent:
Wednesday, December 19, 2007 8:11 PM
Subject:
Letter to the Editor
I wrote
a quick customer review on amazon.com as below. Perhaps your
magazine (yes, I subscribe) could answer these questions? -- Lou Sheehan
Struggle
for Vicksburg (DVD Video)
A
workmanlike presentation of some of the very basic facts of the Siege. To
my disappointment, no re-enactors were used.
I?ve yet
to across a source that answers these questions that follow, so I don?t
want to imply my asking them suggests unique faults with this movie.
To what
extent could the Fort of Vicksburg inhibit Union supply river traffic
upstream and downstream (i.e., completely? 30% 70?)?
Realizing
rivers were relatively efficient ways to transport supplies (vis-à-vis
wagons and mules albeit I am not as certain as to the relative merits
between the use of rivers and railroads), how critical was it to have
?unrestricted? access to the ENTIRE river? (Recall, New Orleans was
in Union hands.)
What
would the effects have been ? and the responses to ? random/ sporadic/varying
placements of Rebel cannon along the long shoreline of the otherwise
?unrestricted? river?
By only
holding a non-besieged Vicksburg, did that allow the Rebels to
effectively transfer supplies and troops across the Misssissippi from
West to East?
Beginning
in the summer of 1863, how much material and how many troops were
effectively contained in the Western Confederacy and prohibited from
moving East? Assuming any, how much of a difference might they have made
and how? Louis J Sheehan
000000000000000000
Ancient Source on the Goths -
Herodotus
The ancient Greeks considered the
Goths to be Scythians. The name Scythian is used in Herodotus (440 B.C.) to
describe barbarians who lived on their horses north of the Black Sea and were
probably not Goths. When the Goths came to live in the same area, they were
considered to be Scythians because of their barbarian way of living. It is hard
to know when the people we call Goths began to intrude on the Roman Empire.
According to Michael Kulikowski, in Rome's Gothic Wars, the first
"securely attested" Gothic raid took place in A.D. 238, when Goths sacked
Histria. In 249 they attacked Marcianople. A year later, under their king
Cniva, they sacked several Balkan cities. In 251, Cniva routed Emperor Decius
at Abrittus. The raids continued and moved from the Black Sea to the Aegean
where the historian Dexippus successfully defended a besieged Athens against
them. He later wrote about the Gothic Wars in his Scythica. Although most of
Dexippus is lost, the historian Zosimus had access to his historical writing.
By the end of the 260s the Roman Empire was winning against the Goths.
Medieval Source on the Goths -
Jordanes
The story of the Goths generally
begins in Scandinavia, as is told by the historian Jordanes in his The Origin
and Deeds of the Goths, chapter 4:
" IV (25) Now from this island of Scandza,
as from a hive of races or a womb of nations, the Goths are said to have come
forth long ago under their king, Berig by name. As soon as they disembarked
from their ships and set foot on the land, they straightway gave their name to
the place. And even to-day it is said to be called Gothiscandza. (26) Soon they
moved from here to the abodes of the Ulmerugi, who then dwelt on the shores of
Ocean, where they pitched camp, joined battle with them and drove them from
their homes. Then they subdued their neighbors, the Vandals, and thus added to
their victories. But when the number of the people increased greatly and
Filimer, son of Gadaric, reigned as king--about the fifth since Berig--he
decided that the army of the Goths with their families should move from that
region. (27) In search of suitable homes and pleasant places they came to the
land of Scythia, called Oium in that tongue. Here they were delighted with the
great richness of the country, and it is said that when half the army had been
brought over, the bridge whereby they had crossed the river fell in utter ruin,
nor could anyone thereafter pass to or fro. For the place is said to be
surrounded by quaking bogs and an encircling abyss, so that by this double
obstacle nature has made it inaccessible. And even to-day one may hear in that
neighborhood the lowing of cattle and may find traces of men, if we are to
believe the stories of travellers, although we must grant that they hear these
things from afar."
Germans and Goths
Michael Kulikowsi says the idea that the
Goths were associated with the Scandinavians and therefore Germans had great
appeal in the 19th century and was supported by the discovery of a linguistic
relationship between the languages of the Goths and Germans. The idea that a
language relationship implies an ethnic relationship was popular but doesn't
bear out in practice. Kulikowski says the only evidence of a Gothic people from
before the third century comes from Jordanes, whose word is suspect.
Kulikowski on the Problems of Using
Jordanes
Jordanes wrote in the second half of
the sixth century. He based his history on the no longer extant writing of a
Roman nobleman named Cassiodorus whose work he had been asked to abridge.
Jordanes did not have the history in front of him when he wrote, so how much
was his own invention can't be ascertained. Much of Jordanes' writing has been
rejected as too fanciful, but the Scandinavian origin has been accepted.
Kulikowski points to some of the
far-fetched passages in Jordanes' history to say that Jordanes is unreliable.
Where his reports are corroborated elsewhere, they can be used, but where there
is no supporting evidence, we need other reasons for accepting. In the case of
the so-called origins of the Goths, any supporting evidence comes from people
using Jordanes as a source.
Kulikowski also objects to using
archaeological evidence as support because artifacts moved around and were
traded. In addition, archaeologists have based their attribution of Gothic
artifacts to Jordanes.
So, if Kulikowski is right, we don't
know where the Goths came from or where they were before their third century
excursions into the Roman Empire.
Glacier on Mars?
The European Space Agency has released
news that they may have found an active glacier on Mars!
Picture of Mars from Mars Express
probe showing a possible glacier
This picture shows the possible
glacier taken by the Mars Express orbiter. It sure looks like one! It’s located
in Deuteronilus Mensae, which is in the moderate northern Martian latitude. The
feature has not been confirmed as a glacier, but it does show ridging like a
glacier, and there appears to be water ice on the ridges as you’d expect to see
on a glacier. Followup observations will be made to see if they can find
features of water in the spectrum of the area.
Old glaciers have been found on Mars,
but this one may be far younger, only thousands of years old. It’s also not
clear that, if this is a glacier, where the water ice is coming from. Some say
it wells up from underground, and others say it comes from snow.
This is very cool news. I hope it pans
out; once again it shows us that Mars is not just a bright red dot in the sky.
It’s a place, a location, a world we can — and do — visit.
http://www.amazon.com/Struggle-for-Vicksburg/dp/B000EM6XDM/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1198168389&sr=1-1
vvvvvvvvvvvv
>
http://louis-j-sheehan.us/Blog/blog.aspx
http://www.amazon.com/Struggle-for-Vicksburg/dp/B000EM6XDM/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1198168389&sr=1-1
Sir --
Thank you for your very prompt and
informative reply. Might I ask for
one clarification (I can read whatever response you have in the magazine if you
are so inclined)?
With Vicksburg standing, was the Rebel
cross-river (shore to shore) transport of goods -- say salt -- and men almost
entirely limited to a small corridor in the shadow of Vicksburg itself, and,
assuming so, was such cross-river traffic therefore safe from Union
interference? If there was one
small corridor, then it would seem that cross-river traffic would have been
ended simply by occupying the bank of the river across from the city
(although such limited effort
would not have resulted in the other benefits you mentioned earlier)?
I'll mention I recall you from the old
Wargamer and S&T days. I
started wargaming in the mid-70.
Life has been such that only in the past year have I again been reading
about the American Civil War.
Knowing some of your past, I'll ask another question/suggest another
possible article:
In my own lay-person's terms, with a
few notable(AHEM!) exceptions, Jeb Stuart & Co. had the reputation of
providing General Lee very good and timely information and for providing good
cavalry screens. Could we read an
article about how such scouting and screening was organized? That is, graphs showing -- standard?
-- patterns of dispersal, amount
of cavalry used to satisfy the missions, how one side would react if it thought
it might have been discovered/the other side might react if it stumbled across
apparent screening/scouting activity?
I would ask more questions but I'm not a horse-person and should leave
that up to others. The basic point
is: describe in some detail an active cavalry screening (say a movement
up/through the Shenandoah "major" or through Maryland or from the
Union point of view ) and an active large-scale scouting mission (perhaps that
by Buford at the opening of Gettysburg or before Brandy Station or even that
relating to a smaller engagement such as the Battle of Corinth (it seems information
about the enemy was so much more lacking in the West than in the East despite
the presence of cavalry)).
Again, many thanks,
--Lou
On Wednesday, December 19, 2007, at
11:39PM, "Keith Poulter" <northandsouth@netptc.net> wrote:
>Louis,
>
> I will try to find space for your
letter in the Crossfire column, and print as close to definitive answers as we
can. For now, and just for your personal attention, here are my personal
responses off the top of my head:
>
>1. There wasn't exactly a
"Fort Vicksburg," but the guns of the city could pretty much rule out
any Union river movement upstream, as the current was fierce and vessels could
only have made slow headway against it, leaving them sitting ducks for a
considerable length of time. Daylight movement by anything except an armored
vessel would have been suicidal. Downstream movement would also have been
hazardous (witness the transports that ran the gauntlet on 22 April, 1863 -- I
hope I got that date right, no time to look it up right now. Effectively therefore,
movement up and down the Mississippi was blocked -- as a regular supply route
-- as long as the Confederates held Vicksburg.
>
>2. It wasn't critical, in the
sense that it was not vital for Union goods/supplies/men to move up or down the
river. It was, however, politically critical, for the farmers of the Mid-West
wanted to be able to ship their product down the river. Economically the
importance of this had declined before the war, with the linkage of the
Mid-West to the East by railroad (and canal). Nevertheless, the river route
still loomed large in the consciousness of those in Illinois, Missouri,
Wisconsin, Iowa, etc.
>
>3. The Confedrates did attempt to
interdict the river by placing artillery along the shore, and moving it when
threatened. However, the Union riverine vessels and the use of marines and
others to land and ravage localities used for such operations -- and the
limited effect of such artillery -- rendered this a nuisance, but not more.
>
>4. Yes. There was considerable
cross-river traffic (west to east) prior to the siege -- especially important
was salt, used to cure meat for the eastern armies. It wasn't the fall of
Vicksburg that halted this flow of goods, so much as the presence of the Union
navy on the river. Of course, once Vicksburg (and then Port Hudson) fell, the
navy presence became that much more effective.
>
>5. I don't know
numbers/quantities. However, the loss of salt alone made the supply of meat to
the Army of North Virginia more problematic, and this added significantly to
Lee's logistical difficulties.
>
>Confederate trans-Mississippi
commander Kirby Smith failed to come to the aid of those on the eastern shore,
but in any case I think his contribution could not have been very significant.
Also, the Union had enough troops west of the Mississippi to confront the
Confederates there, so probably any long-term movement of Confederate troops
across the river would have unhinged their position west of the river.
>Confederate attacks on Union
positions on the western shore of the Mississippi were singularly unsuccessful,
viz. Helena, Milliken's Bend.
>
>Louis, as I said, that's just off
the top of my head for you. I will consult Terry Winschel, park historian at
Vicksburg, to see what he can add (for publication) and how far he agrees with
what I have said.
>
>best wishes,
>
>Keith
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Louis Sheehan
> To: crossfire@northandsouthmagazine.com
> Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2007 8:11 PM
> Subject: Letter to the Editor
>
>
> I wrote a quick customer review on amazon.com as below. Perhaps your magazine (yes, I
subscribe) could answer these questions?
--Lou Sheehan
>
>
> Struggle for Vicksburg
(DVD Video)
>
>
> A workmanlike presentation of some of the very basic facts
of the Siege. To my
disappointment, no re-enactors were used.
>
> I?ve yet to across a source that answers these questions
that follow, so I don?t want to imply my asking them suggests unique faults
with this movie.
>
> To what extent could the Fort of Vicksburg inhibit Union
supply river traffic upstream and downstream (i.e., completely? 30% 70?)?
>
> Realizing rivers were relatively efficient ways to transport
supplies (vis-à-vis wagons and mules albeit I am not as certain as to the
relative merits between the use of rivers and railroads), how critical was it
to have ?unrestricted? access to the ENTIRE river? (Recall, New Orleans was in Union hands.)
>
> What would the effects have been ? and the responses to ?
random/sporadic/varying placements of Rebel cannon along the long shoreline of
the otherwise ?unrestricted? river?
>
> By only holding a non-besieged Vicksburg, did that allow the
Rebels to effectively transfer supplies and troops across the Misssissippi from
West to East?
>
> Beginning in
the summer of 1863, how much material and how many troops were
effectively contained in the Western Confederacy and prohibited from moving
East? Assuming any, how much of a difference might they have made and how? Louis J Sheehan
>
>
>
>From: "Louis Sheehan"
<lousheehan@mac.com>
>To: <holmesjw@bellsouth.net>
>Date: December 20, 2007 07:23:26
AM PST
>Subject: Fwd: Vicksburg 2
>
>
>>From: "Louis
Sheehan" <lousheehan@mac.com>
>>To:
<crossfire@northandsouthmagazine.com>
>>Cc:
<northandsouth@netptc.net>
>>Date: December 20, 2007
07:20:30 AM PST
>>Subject: Vicksburg 2
>>
>>
>>Sir --
>>
>>Thank you for your very prompt
and informative reply. Might I ask
for one clarification (I can read whatever response you have in the magazine if
you are so inclined)?
>>
>>With Vicksburg standing, was
the Rebel cross-river (shore to shore) transport of goods -- say salt -- and
men almost entirely limited to a small corridor in the shadow of Vicksburg
itself, and, assuming so, was such cross-river traffic therefore safe from
Union interference? If there was
one small corridor, then it would seem that cross-river traffic would have been
ended simply by occupying the bank of the river across from the city (although such limited effort would not have
resulted in the other benefits you mentioned earlier)?
>>
>>
>>I'll mention I recall you from
the old Wargamer and S&T days.
I started wargaming in the mid-70.
Life has been such that only in the past year have I again been reading
about the American Civil War.
Knowing some of your past, I'll ask another question/suggest another
possible article:
>>
>>
>>In my own lay-person's terms,
with a few notable(AHEM!) exceptions, Jeb Stuart & Co. had the reputation
of providing General Lee very good and timely information and for providing
good cavalry screens. Could we
read an article about how such scouting and screening was organized? That is, graphs showing -- standard? -- patterns of dispersal, amount of
cavalry used to satisfy the missions, how one side would react if it thought it
might have been discovered/the other side might react if it stumbled across
apparent screening/scouting activity?
I would ask more questions but I'm not a horse-person and should leave
that up to others. The basic point
is: describe in some detail an active cavalry screening (say a movement
up/through the Shenandoah "major" or through Maryland or from the
Union point of view ) and an active large-scale scouting mission (perhaps that
by Buford at the opening of Gettysburg or before Brandy Station or even that
relating to a smaller engagement such as the Battle of Corinth (it seems
information about the enemy was so much more lacking in the West than in the
East despite the presence of cavalry)).
>>
>>Again, many thanks,
>>
>>
>>--Lou
>>
>>
>>
>>On Wednesday, December 19,
2007, at 11:39PM, "Keith Poulter" <northandsouth@netptc.net>
wrote:
>>>Louis,
>>>
>>>I will try to find space
for your letter in the Crossfire column, and print as close to definitive
answers as we can. For now, and just for your personal attention, here are my
personal responses off the top of my head:
>>>
>>>1. There wasn't exactly a
"Fort Vicksburg," but the guns of the city could pretty much rule out
any Union river movement upstream, as the current was fierce and vessels could
only have made slow headway against it, leaving them sitting ducks for a
considerable length of time. Daylight movement by anything except an armored
vessel would have been suicidal. Downstream movement would also have been
hazardous (witness the transports that ran the gauntlet on 22 April, 1863 -- I
hope I got that date right, no time to look it up right now. Effectively
therefore, movement up and down the Mississippi was blocked -- as a regular
supply route -- as long as the Confederates held Vicksburg.
>>>
>>>2. It wasn't critical, in
the sense that it was not vital for Union goods/supplies/men to move up or down
the river. It was, however, politically critical, for the farmers of the
Mid-West wanted to be able to ship their product down the river. Economically
the importance of this had declined before the war, with the linkage of the
Mid-West to the East by railroad (and canal). Nevertheless, the river route
still loomed large in the consciousness of those in Illinois, Missouri,
Wisconsin, Iowa, etc.
>>>
>>>3. The Confedrates did
attempt to interdict the river by placing artillery along the shore, and moving
it when threatened. However, the Union riverine vessels and the use of marines
and others to land and ravage localities used for such operations -- and the
limited effect of such artillery -- rendered this a nuisance, but not more.
>>>
>>>4. Yes. There was
considerable cross-river traffic (west to east) prior to the siege --
especially important was salt, used to cure meat for the eastern armies. It
wasn't the fall of Vicksburg that halted this flow of goods, so much as the
presence of the Union navy on the river. Of course, once Vicksburg (and then
Port Hudson) fell, the navy presence became that much more effective.
>>>
>>>5. I don't know
numbers/quantities. However, the loss of salt alone made the supply of meat to
the Army of North Virginia more problematic, and this added significantly to
Lee's logistical difficulties.
>>>
>>>Confederate
trans-Mississippi commander Kirby Smith failed to come to the aid of those on
the eastern shore, but in any case I think his contribution could not have been
very significant. Also, the Union had enough troops west of the Mississippi to
confront the Confederates there, so probably any long-term movement of
Confederate troops across the river would have unhinged their position west of
the river.
>>>Confederate attacks on
Union positions on the western shore of the Mississippi were singularly
unsuccessful, viz. Helena, Milliken's Bend.
>>>
>>>Louis, as I said, that's
just off the top of my head for you. I will consult Terry Winschel, park
historian at Vicksburg, to see what he can add (for publication) and how far he
agrees with what I have said.
>>>
>>>best wishes,
>>>
>>>Keith
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: Louis Sheehan
>>> To: crossfire@northandsouthmagazine.com
>>> Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2007 8:11 PM
>>> Subject: Letter to the Editor
>>>
>>>
>>> I wrote a quick customer review on amazon.com as below. Perhaps your magazine (yes, I
subscribe) could answer these questions?
--Lou Sheehan
>>>
>>>
>>> Struggle for Vicksburg
(DVD Video)
>>>
>>>
>>> A workmanlike presentation of some of the very basic facts
of the Siege. To my
disappointment, no re-enactors were used.
>>>
>>> I?ve yet to across a source that answers these questions
that follow, so I don?t want to imply my asking them suggests unique faults
with this movie.
>>>
>>> To what extent could the Fort of Vicksburg inhibit Union
supply river traffic upstream and downstream (i.e., completely? 30% 70?)?
>>>
>>> Realizing rivers were relatively efficient ways to transport
supplies (vis-à-vis wagons and mules albeit I am not as certain as to the
relative merits between the use of rivers and railroads), how critical was it
to have ?unrestricted? access to the ENTIRE river? (Recall, New Orleans was in Union hands.)
>>>
>>> What would the effects have been ? and the responses to ?
random/sporadic/varying placements of Rebel cannon along the long shoreline of
the otherwise ?unrestricted? river?
>>>
>>> By only holding a non-besieged Vicksburg, did that allow the
Rebels to effectively transfer supplies and troops across the Misssissippi from
West to East?
>>>
>>> Beginning in
the summer of 1863, how much material and how many troops were
effectively contained in the Western Confederacy and prohibited from moving
East? Assuming any, how much of a difference might they have made and how? Louis J Sheehan
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>From: "Louis Sheehan"
<lousheehan@mac.com>
>To:
<crossfire@northandsouthmagazine.com>
>Date: December 19, 2007 08:10:24
PM PST
>Subject: Vicksburg
>
>Sir --
>
>Below is a quick summary I wrote
on amazon.com. Perhaps your
magazine (yes, I'm a subscriber) could address these questuons?
>
> --Lou Sheehan
>
>
>
>
>
>Struggle for Vicksburg (DVD Video)
>
>
>A workmanlike presentation of some
of the very basic facts of the Siege.
To my disappointment, no re-enactors were used.
>
>I?ve yet to across a source that
answers these questions that follow, so I don?t want to imply my asking them
suggests unique faults with this movie.
>
>To what extent could the Fort of
Vicksburg inhibit Union supply river traffic upstream and downstream (i.e.,
completely? 30% 70?)?
>
>Realizing rivers were relatively
efficient ways to transport supplies (vis-à-vis wagons and mules albeit I am
not as certain as to the relative merits between the use of rivers and
railroads), how critical was it to have ?unrestricted? access to the ENTIRE
river? (Recall, New Orleans was in
Union hands.)
>
>What would the effects have been ?
and the responses to ? random/sporadic/varying placements of Rebel cannon along
the long shoreline of the otherwise ?unrestricted? river?
>
>By only holding a non-besieged
Vicksburg, did that allow the Rebels to effectively transfer supplies and
troops across the Misssissippi from West to East?
>
>Beginning in the summer of 1863, how much material
and how many troops were effectively contained in the Western Confederacy and
prohibited from moving East? Assuming any, how much of a difference might they
have made and how? Louis J Sheehan
>
>
http://louis-j-sheehan.us/Blog/blog.aspx
>
8888888888
PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY
DOW JONES REPRINTS
This copy is for your personal,
non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to
your colleagues, clients or customers, use the Order Reprints tool at the
bottom of any article or visit:
www.djreprints.com.
• See a sample reprint in PDF format.
• Order a reprint of this article now.
With Online Services,
Foreign Texts Can Get
Lost in Translation
By SARMAD ALI
December 20, 2007
As the need for global communication
increases, online translation services are in greater demand. Users are
attracted to the breakneck speed at which online translation is done and the
price. Those that aren't free are still fairly inexpensive.
New languages have been added to the
traditional lists and Arabic, in particular, has been in demand recently. I
spent the past few weeks tinkering with four free online services, translating
various texts from English to Arabic and vice versa to test their speed and
accuracy. I tested Google's Language Tools and services from Applied Language
Solutions, WorldLingo Translations and Systran.
No comments:
Post a Comment