x- 92 Louis Sheehan

tly toward a base before throwing to that base but does not require him to throw (except to first base only) because he steps. It is possible, with runners on first and third, for the pitcher to step toward third and not throw, merely to bluff the runner back to third; then seeing the runner on first start for second, turn and step toward and throw to first base. This is legal. However, if, with runners on first and third, the pitcher, while in contact with the rubber, steps toward third and then immediately and in practically the same motion “wheels” and throws to first base, it is obviously an attempt to deceive the runner at first base, and in such a move it is practically impossible to step directly toward first base before the throw to first base, and such a move shall be called a balk. Of course, if the pitcher steps off the rubber and then makes such a move, it is not a balk. (d) The pitcher, while touching his plate, throws, or feints a throw to an unoccupied base, except for the purpose of making a play; (e) The pitcher makes an illegal pitch; Rule 8.05(e) Comment: A quick pitch is an illegal pitch. Umpires will judge a quick pitch as one delivered before the batter is reasonably set in the batter’s box. With runners on base the penalty is a balk; with no runners on base, it is a ball. The quick pitch is dangerous and should not be permitted. (f) The pitcher delivers the ball to the batter while he is not facing the batter; (g) The pitcher makes any motion naturally associated with his pitch while he is not touching the pitcher’s plate; (h) The pitcher unnecessarily delays the game; Rule 8.05(h) Comment: Rule 8.05(h) shall not apply when a warning is given pursuant to Rule 8.02(c) (which prohibits intentional delay of a game by throwing to fielders not in an attempt to put a runner out). If a pitcher is ejected pursuant to Rule 8.02(c) for continuing to delay the game, the penalty in Rule 8.05(h) shall also apply. Rule 8.04 (which sets a time limit for a pitcher to deliver the ball when the bases are unoccupied) applies only when there are no runners on base. (i) The pitcher, without having the ball, stands on or astride the pitcher’s plate or while off the plate, he feints a pitch; (j) The pitcher, after coming to a legal pitching position, removes one hand from the ball other than in an actual pitch, or in throwing to a base; (k) The pitcher, while touching his plate, accidentally or intentionally drops the ball; (l) The pitcher, while giving an intentional base on balls, pitches when the catcher is not in the catcher’s box; (m)The pitcher delivers the pitch from Set Position without coming to a stop. PENALTY: The ball is dead, and each runner shall advance one base without liability to be put out, unless the batter reaches first on a hit, an error, a base on balls, a hit batter, or otherwise, and all other runners advance at least one base, in which case the play proceeds without reference to the balk. APPROVED RULING: In cases where a pitcher balks and throws wild, either to a base or to home plate, a runner or runners may advance beyond the base to which he is entitled at his own risk. APPROVED RULING: A runner who misses the first base to which he is advancing and who is called out on appeal shall be considered as having advanced one base for the purpose of this rule. Rule 8.05 Comment: Umpires should bear in mind that the purpose of the balk rule is to prevent the pitcher from deliberately deceiving the base runner. If there is doubt in the umpire’s mind, the “intent” of the pitcher should govern. However, certain specifics should be borne in mind: (a) Straddling the pitcher’s rubber without the ball is to be interpreted as intent to deceive and ruled a balk. (b) With a runner on first base the pitcher may make a complete turn, without hesitating toward first, and throw to second. This is not to be interpreted as throwing to an unoccupied base. Pulling together a compendium of baseball rules. -- Louis Sheehan</p> 20325331 2015-05-09 05:15:52 2015-05-09 05:15:52 open open 8-05-if-there-is-a-runner-or-runners-it-20325331 publish 0 0 post 0 Lou Sheehan Louis Sheehan 8.06 http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2015/05/09/8-20325319/ Sat, 09 May 2015 05:14:02 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>Louis Sheehan ... collection of baseball rules 8.06 A professional league shall adopt the following rule pertaining to the visit of the manager or coach to the pitcher: (a) This rule limits the number of trips a manager or coach may make to any one pitcher in any one inning; (b) A second trip to the same pitcher in the same inning will cause this pitcher’s automatic removal; (c) The manager or coach is prohibited from making a second visit to the mound while the same batter is at bat, but (d) if a pinch-hitter is substituted for this batter, the manager or coach may make a second visit to the mound, but must remove the pitcher. A manager or coach is considered to have concluded his visit to the mound when he leaves the 18-foot circle surrounding the pitcher’s rubber. Rule 8.06 Comment: If the manager or coach goes to the catcher or infielder and that player then goes to the mound or the pitcher comes to him at his position before there is an intervening play (a pitch or other play) that will be the same as the manager or coach going to the mound. Any attempt to evade or circumvent this rule by the manager or coach going to the catcher or an infielder and then that player going to the mound to confer with the pitcher shall constitute a trip to the mound. If the coach goes to the mound and removes a pitcher and then the manager goes to the mound to talk with the new pitcher, that will constitute one trip to that new pitcher that inning. In a case where a manager has made his first trip to the mound and then returns the second time to the mound in the same inning with the same pitcher in the game and the same batter at bat, after being warned by the umpire that he cannot return to the mound, the manager shall be removed from the game and the pitcher required to pitch to the batter until he is retired or gets on base. After the batter is retired, or becomes a base runner, then this pitcher must be removed from the game. The manager should be notified that his pitcher will be removed from the game after he pitches to one hitter, so he can have a substitute pitcher warmed up. The substitute pitcher will be allowed eight preparatory pitches or more if in the umpire’s judgment circumstances justify. </p> 20325319 2015-05-09 05:14:02 2015-05-09 05:14:02 open open 8-20325319 publish 0 0 post 0 Louis Sheehan Lou Sheehan New York Times June 11, 1864 The Kentucky Raid http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2015/05/03/new-york-times-june-11-1864-the-kentucky-raid-20266806/ Sun, 03 May 2015 18:55:26 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>June 11, 1864 THE KENTUCKY RAID; Ordnance Train Attacked A Member of the Legsislature Killed. Later Lexington Entered by a Part of Morgan's Band The Rebels Whipped by Gen.Burbridge. The Repetitions of History. Nomination of Aaron H. Cragin, for United States Senator, from New-Hampshire. The Sixth Ohio Volunteers LOUISVILLE, Ky., Friday, June 10. The ordnance train from Frankfort, yesterday, was attacked near Bagdad, by a rebel force under JENKINS. Mr. SHANKS, a Union member of the Kentucky Legislature, was killed in the encounter. Railroad men think that the train may have returned safely to Frankfort, as its engine was reversed immediately upon the attack, and the cars proceeded toward Frankfort. A car of armed soldiers which proceeded up the road last night, to learn the extent of the disaster, has not returned, and we have no telegraphic communication with Frankfort since yesterday afternoon. CINCINNATI, Friday, June 10. Posted by Louis Sheehan. Not written by Louis Sheehan Gen. BURBRIDGE, who has been following the rebels since they left Pound Gap, came up with them yesterday at Mount Sterling and whipped them handsomely. A portion of MORGAN's command entered Lexington at 2 o'clock this morning, burned the Kentucky Central Railroad depot, robbed a number of stores, and left at 10 o'clock in the direction of Georgetown and Frankfort. BURBRIDGE followed them. SECOND DISPATCH. CINCINNATI, Friday, June 10. One of MORGAN's men, captured at Maysville, reports that the force in Kentucky is immediately under the command of Gen. MORGAN, Col. ALSTON and Col. SMITH; that the total force is about 3,000, a large portion of them dismounted cavalry. They entered the State at Pound Gap, preceded by a scouting party under EVERRELLE to pick up horses for their dismounted men, passed through Hazel Green, Owingsville and Flemingsburgh, and took Maysville without resistance, robbing its citizens of money and other valuables. The farms of Union men were stripped of horses, while those of rebel citizens were protected. EVERELLE left Maysville on Wednesday for Mount Sterling, at which place it is thought MORGAN's men are concentrating, with the intention of attacking Lexington. The position of affairs in the central part of the State to-day is not known, as communications are broken with Lexington. It is thought that the intention of the rebels is to destroy all the railroads possible, and to make their exit through Central Kentucky and Middle Tennessee. The Kentucky Central Railroad is being repaired. Trains will run to Cynthiana to-morrow. Gen. HOBSON left Covington to-day, to open communications with Lexington. To the Editor of the New-York Times: "History repeats itself." "And there is no new thing under the sun." For the original of the Cleveland Convention, see 1st Samuel, 22d chapter, 2d verse: "And every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves unto him; and he became a Captain over them: and there were with him about four hundred men." A CONSTANT READER. CONCORD, Friday, June 10. The Republican members of the Legislature met in caucas last night, and nominated AARON H. CRAGIN, of Lebanon, for United States Senator, in place of Mr. HALE. There were four ballotings. On the first ballot G.M. Marston had 59; A.H. Cragin, 58; Amos Tuck, 37; John P. Hale, 27; J.M. Edwards, 19; and five scattering. On the fourth ballot the whole number was 201; Mr. A.H. Cragin had 126; Mr. Marsten, 75. NASHVILLE, Friday, June 10. The Sixth Ohio Volunteers will arrive to-day, en route to the North, to be mustered out of service. Copyright 2015 The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Back to Top </p> 20266806 2015-05-03 18:55:26 2015-05-03 18:55:26 open open new-york-times-june-11-1864-the-kentucky-raid-20266806 publish 0 0 post 0 Louis Sheehan Lou Sheehan A prior life http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2015/05/03/a-prior-life-20265726/ Sun, 03 May 2015 07:10:04 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>Amazing -- Louis Sheehan Albert G. Jenkins From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Albert Gallatin Jenkins AGJenkins.jpg Representative Albert G. Jenkins Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Virginia's 11th district In office March 4, 1857 – March 3, 1861 Preceded by John S. Carlile Succeeded by John S. Carlile Personal details Born November 10, 1830 Cabell County, Virginia Died May 21, 1864 (aged 33) Battle of Cloyd's Mountain Political party Democratic Military service Allegiance Confederate States of America Service/branch Confederate States Army Rank Confederate States of America General.png Brigadier general Battles/wars American Civil War: Battle of Cloyd's Mountain (DOW) Albert Gallatin Jenkins (November 10, 1830 – May 21, 1864) was an attorney, planter, representative to the United States Congress and First Confederate Congress, and a Confederate brigadier general during the American Civil War. The commander of a brigade of cavalry from what would become West Virginia, he was mortally wounded at the Battle of Cloyd's Mountain near Dublin, Virginia. Contents [hide] 1 Early life and career 2 Civil War 3 Memorialization 4 See also 5 Notes 6 References 7 External links Early life and career[edit] Jenkins was born to wealthy plantation owner Capt. William Jenkins and his wife Jeanette Grigsby McNutt in Cabell County, Virginia, now West Virginia. At age fifteen, he attended Marshall Academy. He graduated from Jefferson College in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, in 1848 and from Harvard Law School in 1850. Jenkins was admitted to the bar the same year and practiced in Charleston, before inheriting a portion of his father's sprawling plantation in 1859. He was named a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in Cincinnati in 1856, and was elected as a Democrat to the Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth United States Congresses. Civil War[edit] Jenkins' grave in the Confederate plot at Spring Hill Cemetery in Huntington, West Virginia With the outbreak of the Civil War and Virginia's subsequent secession, Jenkins declined running for a third term and resigned from Congress in early 1861. He returned home and raised a company of mounted partisan rangers. By June, his company had enrolled in the Confederate Army as a part of the 8th Virginia Cavalry, with Jenkins as its colonel. By the year's end, his men had become such a nuisance to the Federals in western Virginia that military governor Francis H. Pierpont appealed to President Abraham Lincoln to send in a strong leader to stamp out the rebellion in the area. Early in 1862, Jenkins left the army to become a delegate to the First Confederate Congress. He was appointed brigadier general August 1, 1862, and returned to active duty. Throughout the fall, his men performed well, continuing to harass Union troops and supply lines, including the vital Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. In September, Jenkins's cavalry raided northern Kentucky and now West Virginia. They briefly entered extreme southern Ohio near Buffington Island, becoming one of the first organized Confederate units to enter a Northern state. In December, Robert E. Lee requested that Jenkins and his men transfer to the Shenandoah Valley. After spending the winter foraging for supplies, he led his men on a raid in March 1863 through western Virginia. During the Gettysburg Campaign, Jenkins' brigade formed the cavalry screen for Richard S. Ewell's Second Corps. Jenkins led his men through the Cumberland Valley into Pennsylvania and seized Chambersburg, burning down nearby railroad structures and bridges. He accompanied Ewell's column to Carlisle, briefly skirmishing with Union militia at the Battle of Sporting Hill near Harrisburg. During the subsequent Battle of Gettysburg, Jenkins was wounded on July 2 and missed the rest of the fighting. He did not recover sufficiently to rejoin his command until autumn. He spent the early part of 1864 raising and organizing a large cavalry force for service in western Virginia. By May, Jenkins had been appointed Commander of the Department of Western Virginia with his headquarters at Dublin. Hearing that Union Brig. Gen. George Crook had been dispatched from the Kanawha Valley with a large force, Jenkins took the field to contest the Federal arrival. On May 9, 1864, he was severely wounded and captured during the Battle of Cloyd's Mountain. A Union surgeon amputated Jenkins' arm, but he never recovered, dying twelve days later. He was initially buried in New Dublin Presbyterian Cemetery. After the war, his remains were reinterred at his home in Greenbottom, near Huntington, West Virginia. He was later reinterred in the Confederate plot in Spring Hill Cemetery in Huntington. Memorialization[edit] Green Bottom, Jenkins's home, is currently being restored as a museum. Jenkins's home, Green Bottom, has been restored and is now a museum run by the West Virginia Division of Culture and History.[1] In 1937, Marshall University constructed Jenkins Hall, naming it in honor of the distinguished Confederate cavalry officer. In 2005, a monument to General Jenkins was erected in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, commemorating his service during the Gettysburg Campaign.[2] See also[edit] Portal icon American Civil War portal List of American Civil War generals Alberta Gallatin Jenkins Notes[edit] Jump up ^ The Jenkins Plantation Museum Jump up ^ Camp Curtin Historical Society and Civil War Round Table References[edit] Evans, Clement A., ed. Confederate Military History: A Library of Confederate States History. 12 vols. Atlanta: Confederate Publishing Company, 1899. OCLC 833588. Tagg, Larry. The Generals of Gettysburg. Campbell, CA: Savas Publishing, 1998. ISBN 1-882810-30-9. Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. ISBN 0-8071-0823-5. External links[edit] Congressional biography West Virginia Division of Culture and History biography Ghosts of Green Bottom [show] v t e Louis Sheehan </p> 20265726 2015-05-03 07:10:04 2015-05-03 07:10:04 open open a-prior-life-20265726 publish 0 0 post 0 Lou Sheehan Louis Sheehan Battle of Carlisle http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2015/05/03/battle-of-carlisle-20265720/ Sun, 03 May 2015 07:03:37 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>Battle of Carlisle From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Battle of Carlisle Part of Gettysburg Campaign Date July 1, 1863 Location Pennsylvania Carlisle & Carlisle Barracks 40.2011°N 77.1845°W[citation needed]Coordinates: 40.2011°N 77.1845°W[citation needed] Result Inconclusive (Confederate withdrawal) Belligerents United States USA (Union) Confederate States of America CSA (Confederacy) Commanders and leaders William F. Smith Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart Strength PA & NY state militia (~1,000 men) 3 cavalry brigades, e.g.: Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's brigade Casualties and losses 1 KIA, 12 wounded 8 casualties [show] v t e Gettysburg Campaign The Battle of Carlisle was an American Civil War skirmish [1] in Pennsylvania on the same day as the Battle of Gettysburg, First Day. Stuart's Confederate cavalry briefly engaged Union militia under Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith at Carlisle and set fire to the Carlisle Barracks. Stuart's cavalry withdrew and arrived at the Battle of Gettysburg, Second Day, to the annoyance and concern of Gen. Robert E. Lee.[need quotation to verify] After Carlisle was settled in 1741, the Carlisle Barracks military post was established nearby in 1757 and had an antebellum United States Army Cavalry School (e.g., Captain Stoneman’s four companies had a Civil War encampment at Horner’s Mill on May 6, 1861.)[1] By June 1863 the barrack's cavalry had been "withdrawn to Harrisburg".[2] At the end of the month, Confederate troops of Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia a few days earlier. On June 27, 1863, Ewell stopped at Carlisle en route to Harrisburg and requisitioned supplies, forage, and food from the populace. Ewell, as well as some of his officers, had been stationed at the Carlisle Barracks prior to the Civil War when they were still members of the United States Army. He paused in Carlisle while sending his cavalry under Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins towards the Susquehanna River and Harrisburg. After resting much of his infantry overnight, Ewell moved northward in his quest to seize the state capital. After the Confederates left in response to an order from Lee to concentrate near Gettysburg, Carlisle had been reoccupied by Baldy Smith and a small contingent of New York and Pennsylvania militia from the Department of the Susquehanna, dispatched by the department commander, Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch. The 32nd and 33rd Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia, Landis's Philadelphia militia artillery battery, and a company of the 1st New York Cavalry formed Smith's force. Stuart's raid During the early evening of July 1, Stuart led two brigades of cavalry, at the end of their raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, to Carlisle to look for supplies and to attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of Ewell's troops.[3][verification needed] A third brigade, under Wade Hampton, remained behind in York County to guard a train of 125 captured Federal supply wagons. Instead of finding Ewell, Stuart encountered Smith's militiamen. Despite having a large numerical advantage, Stuart's troopers were too exhausted from a month of campaigning to attack the town outright, and Stuart initially feared that the enemy troops were veterans from the Army of the Potomac.[need quotation to verify] After learning that Smith's men were only militia, Stuart sent Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee into Carlisle with a white flag, telling Smith to either evacuate the town or clear out the women and children. Smith replied that he had already done the latter, and refused to surrender. Stuart's horse artillery under Captain James Breathed then began bombarding the town. After shelling Carlisle for several hours, Stuart received word that fighting had broken out to the southwest at Gettysburg between the main armies. Unable to take the town by force, Stuart disengaged, having ordered his troops to set on fire the Carlisle Barracks. Stuart's troops started moving towards the fighting at Gettysburg about 1:00 am on July 2, 1863. In addition to minimal Union and Confederate casualties, a lumber yard and the town gas works were destroyed after being set fire. However, Stuart's delay at Carlisle impacted his ability to rendezvous with Lee's main army. Louis Sheehan mrely posted this in an effort to collect information about the Civil War.</p> 20265720 2015-05-03 07:03:37 2015-05-03 07:03:37 open open battle-of-carlisle-20265720 publish 0 0 post 0 Louis Sheehan Lou Sheehan 71 Years Ago FDR Dropped a Truthbomb That Still Resonates Today http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2015/04/12/71-years-ago-fdr-dropped-a-truthbomb-that-still-resonates-today-20233633/ Sun, 12 Apr 2015 17:23:57 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>71 Years Ago FDR Dropped a Truthbomb That Still Resonates Today —By Marianne Szegedy-Maszak| Sun Apr. 12, 2015 6:00 AM EDT Louis Sheehan did not write thi ... someone else wrote it. Only posted by Louis Sheehan. President Franklin D. Roosevelt broadcasts a speech in 1943. George R. Skadding/AP When was the last time you heard an American politician invoke Franklin Delano Roosevelt's policies as models to be emulated? Democrats avoid him because his New Deal policies seem to embody the tax-and-spend, overbearing, and intrusive central government that always puts them on the defensive. And why would a Republican bother with Roosevelt when they believe that Obama is so much worse? Sunday is the seventieth anniversary of FDR's death on April 12, 1945. Since anniversaries are always good opportunities to reflect on the past, I reread one of Roosevelt's speeches that I somehow still remember studying in college. It was his penultimate State of the Union Address, which he delivered on January 11, 1944, and the one in which he outlined a "second Bill of Rights"—a list of what should constitute basic economic security for Americans. click here Advertise on MotherJones.com The world was still at war. Roosevelt had returned in December from meeting Stalin and Churchill at the Tehran Conference where the three leaders discussed not only the final phase of the war, but also how Europe would be divided after the conflict was over. The worst of the Great Depression was over, remedied in large part by the wartime economy. Roosevelt, who was starting his fourth term and was sick with the flu, decided not to go before Congress. Instead, he delivered the address from the White House. Across the country, people could tune in on their radios and hear their president speak. Looking at his speech again, I was struck by how he grapples with so many of the same issues that we do now. Here he is on the domination of special interests: [W]hile the majority goes on about its great work without complaint, a noisy minority maintains an uproar of demands for special favors for special groups. There are pests who swarm through the lobbies of the Congress and the cocktail bars of Washington, representing these special groups as opposed to the basic interests of the Nation as a whole. They have come to look upon the war primarily as a chance to make profits for themselves at the expense of their neighbors—profits in money or in terms of political or social preferment. And whose interests should our representatives in Congress represent? Roosevelt reminds them: And I hope you will remember that all of us in this Government represent the fixed income group just as much as we represent business owners, workers, and farmers. This group of fixed income people includes: teachers, clergy, policemen, firemen, widows and minors on fixed incomes, wives and dependents of our soldiers and sailors, and old-age pensioners. They and their families add up to one-quarter of our one hundred and 30 million people. They have few or no high pressure representatives at the Capitol. Then he gets to the reason for why this is usually referred to as his "Second Bill of Rights" speech. In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted...a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, race, or creed. Among these are: The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation; the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; the right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his family a decent living; the right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; the right of every family to a decent home; the right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; the right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; the right to a good education. Today, many politicians oppose the sorts of policies Roosevelt was suggesting here: the minimum wage, the Affordable Care Act, the expansion of Social Security, and a more generous student loan program. Who would have the nerve to frame them not as hopes, or matters of "fairness" but as basic "rights" that should at least be legislated but possibly even enshrined in the Constitution? Here is where Roosevelt's argument gets really interesting. He does not just present this Economic Bill of Rights as a question of fairness or some dreamy utopian ideal of equality. He sees them as a fundamental to national security: All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won we must be prepared to move forward, in the implementation of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-being. America's own rightful place in the world depends in large part upon how fully these and similar rights have been carried into practice for our citizens. For unless there is security here at home there cannot be lasting peace in the world. In the decades that followed, Americans became obsessed with national security issues. Any politician can demonize an opponent, curtail some fundamental right, or snag some cash for a contractor by invoking "national security." But national commitments to economic security for the middle class and the poor are rarely contextualized as national security issues. At least, not in the United States. Our leaders are quick to connect poverty in other parts of the world with national security concerns. In his introduction to a September 2002 National Security Strategy document, presented a year after the attack on the World Trade Center, George W. Bush stated that, while poverty does not directly lead to terrorism, "poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders." We tend to look elsewhere for evidence of the dire consequences of poverty and income inequality. But with the Great Depression a very recent memory, Roosevelt knew that what we did in the world mattered less if we did not do the right thing at home. Maybe it's time to focus on that connection again. S</p> 20233633 2015-04-12 17:23:57 2015-04-12 17:23:57 open open 71-years-ago-fdr-dropped-a-truthbomb-that-still-resonates-today-20233633 publish 0 0 post 0 Louis Sheehan Lou Sheehan King Cotton http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2015/04/12/king-cotton-20232598/ Sun, 12 Apr 2015 03:21:16 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>Cotton Diplomacy In The Civil War Almost unanimously, Southerners believed they could use cotton to lure England and France into recognizing the Confederacy. Since the administration of Jefferson Davis wanted to avoid any appearance of international "blackmail," the Confederate Congress never formally approved an embargo, but state governments and private citizens voluntarily withheld the crop from the market in hopes of causing a "cotton famine" overseas. Theoretically, widespread shortages would shut down European mills, forcing governments to recognize and perhaps come to the military aid of the Confederacy, or to declare the Union blockade ineffective and disregard or break it in order to reopen Southern ports. The "King Cotton" mentality was seriously flawed, not the least in overestimating the value of "white gold." First, a bumper crop in 1860 had glutted the marketplace, lowering prices and allowing mill owners to stockpile. Cotton prices did rise sharply late in 1861, but workers, not owners, suffered from the effects of unemployment. Producers, drawing from their reserves, did not feel the pinch until late in 1862, and within a year imports from India, Egypt, and Brazil sufficiently replaced Southern cotton. Second, Davis, never an astute diplomat, failed to recognize how much Europe feared the possibility of war with the U.S. Private European citizens and industrialists invested in speculative ventures tenuously backed by Southern cotton securities, but their governments would not antagonize the North by recognizing the Confederacy for the sake of guaranteeing those investments or increasing supplies of the staple. Further, Southern society tied cotton inseparably to slavery, and England, the example Napoleon Ill would follow, led the abolitionist movement in the world community. Europe's wait-and-see attitude hardened into unassailable neutrality after the Southern armies suffered reverses beginning at Gettysburg, and Davis and his supporters realized the cotton strategy had failed as a diplomatic tool. They had unwisely hoarded their one great asset and undermined their best chance of financing the war. Source: "Historical Times Encyclopedia of the Civil War" edited by Patricia L. Faust This Page last updated 02/16/02 Louis Sheehan DID NOT write this. </p> 20232598 2015-04-12 03:21:16 2015-04-12 03:21:16 open open king-cotton-20232598 publish 0 0 post 0 Lou Sheehan Louis Sheehan You are here: Home » A Gettysburg Hero’s Irish Memorial June 21, 2010 | 4 Comments A Gettysburg Hero’s Irish Memorial http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2015/04/10/you-are-here-home-a-gettysburg-hero-s-irish-memorial-june-21-2010-4-comments-a-gettysburg-hero-s-irish-memorial-20230954/ Fri, 10 Apr 2015 22:45:39 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>You are here: Home » A Gettysburg Hero’s Irish Memorial June 21, 2010 | 4 Comments A Gettysburg Hero’s Irish Memorial A recent post brought you news of the unveiling of a memorial in Carrick-On-Suir, Co. Tipperary to Captain John Lonergan who won the Medal of Honor at Gettysburg. A follow-up visit has allowed some photos of the memorial to be posted and also provides a backdrop for a more detailed look at Lonergan’s actions in this momentous battle. John Lonergan was born in 1837 at Sir John’s Road, Carrick-On-Suir, Co. Tipperary. His family emigrated to the United States in 1848 where he was active in the Fenian movement both prior to and following the Civil War. Lonergan became a Captain of Company A, 13th Vermont Regiment, a nine-month unit that was organised in October 1862. They spent much of their service on guard duty but joined the main body of the Army of the Potomac in time for its greatest battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania in July 1863. The 13th Vermont arrived at the battlefield on the evening of the first day (July 1st) as part of Brigadier-General Stannard’s 3rd Brigade (2nd Vermont Brigade) of Major-General Abner Doubleday’s 3rd Division. They were part of Major-General Reynolds I Corps. The 13th Vermont’s first major action of the battle took place on the second day (July 2nd), when the regiment were positioned in support of artillery at Cemetery Hill. While stationed here they received an urgent request to rescue a Federal Battery in General Hancock’s section of the line that had been abandoned and was about to be taken by the Confederates. The Vermont men counterattacked and drove the enemy back, in the process recapturing the guns. Having accomplished this the 13th Vermont and Captain John Lonergan’s Company A continued their advance and charged as far as the Emmittsburg Road, where two Confederate artillery pieces were captured. Not content with this, Lonergan and his men then surrounded the Roger’s House which contained a large number of Confederate troops, and forced them to surrender. Despite the heavy fighting that they experienced the 13th Vermont’s role in the battle was not over, as they were to play an important part in the repulse of the Confederate advance on the final day (July 3rd), which has gone down in history as ‘Pickett’s Charge’. The 13th Vermont had arrived at Gettysburg with a strength of some 636 men. They were to lose 10 men killed, 103 wounded and 10 missing (a percentage loss of 19%) during the course of the fighting (Bicheno 2001). Following the battle John Lonergan’s pivotal role in the 13th Vermont’s success on Gettysburg’s second day was acknowledged, as he was the recipient of the Medal of Honor for his actions. The citation indicated that the award was presented as a result of Lonergan’s gallantry in the recapture of four guns, as well as the capture of two additional enemy guns and a number of prisoners. The memorial on the street where he was born in Carrick-On-Suir was officially unveiled on May 8th last. It is in a prominent position on one of the main routes into the town, and is a fitting tribute to the Tipperary native. References & Further Reading Bicheno, Hugh 2001. Gettysburg Clarke, Albert 13th Vermont Infantry History Congressional Medal of Honor Society Share this: EmailFacebook3RedditStumbleUponTwitter4LinkedInGoogleTumblrPinterestPress ThisPocket Related Unveiling of Captain John Lonergan Memorial In "Battle of Gettysburg" Fenian Casualties at Gettysburg In "Battle of Gettysburg" Upcoming Speaking Engagements In "Update" Tags: Gettysburg, Irish History, John Lonergan, Memorial, Tipperary, Vermont Categories: Battle of Gettysburg, Fenians, Medal of Honor, Pennsylvania, Tipperary, Vermont AUTHOR: Damian Shiels I am an archaeologist based in Ireland, specialising in conflict archaeology. View all posts by Damian Shiels → Follow Irish in the American Civil War Follow Irish in the American Civil War via Social Media ← 69th Pennsylvania Marker at GlendaleMyles Walter Keogh Memorial → 4 Comments on “A Gettysburg Hero’s Irish Memorial” Reply Peter PattenMarch 23, 2014 at 10:27 pm # The bulk of the company were Irishman recruited off the marble quarries at West Rutland. My ggrandfather John Patten was a prime candidate for lieutenancy in the company but lacked the literacy skills. The position went to fellow parish of Ardstraw native David McDevitt. The other lieutenant was Wexford man John Sinnott who was killed at Gettysburg Reply Damian ShielsMarch 27, 2014 at 10:26 am # Hi Peter, Thanks for this- I wonder was your g-grandfather fortunate to miss out on that position give the dangers associated! I must say you have really opened my eyes over the past few months to the real wealth of Irish diaspora history in Vermont, it is remarkable. Kind Regards, Damian. Damian. Reply Mike McCarthyDecember 15, 2014 at 10:36 pm # My ancestors were Sinnotts from County Wexford. Are the parents and parish of John Sinnott known? Thanks Reply Damian ShielsDecember 17, 2014 at 11:55 am # Hi Mike, I am not sure- Peter do you have access to that information? Damian. Posted by Louis Sheehan </p> 20230954 2015-04-10 22:45:39 2015-04-10 22:45:39 open open you-are-here-home-a-gettysburg-hero-s-irish-memorial-june-21-2010-4-comments-a-gettysburg-hero-s-irish-memorial-20230954 publish 0 0 post 0 Louis Sheehan Lou Sheehan Union Blockade http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2015/04/09/union-blockade-20227890/ Thu, 09 Apr 2015 04:36:36 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>Louis Sheehan posted but did not write this. Part of the American Civil War An 1861 characterized map of the Union blockade, known as Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan. Date 1861 - 1865 Location Southern United States, Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico Result Union victory, successful blockade of the South. Belligerents United States United States (Union) Confederate States of America Confederate States Commanders and leaders United States Abraham Lincoln Confederate States of America Jefferson Davis Theaters of the American Civil War The Union blockade in the American Civil War was a naval strategy by the United States to prevent the Confederacy from trading. The blockade was proclaimed by President Abraham Lincoln in April 1861, and required the monitoring of 3,500 miles of Atlantic and Gulf coastline, including 12 major ports, notably New Orleans and Mobile. Many attempts to run the blockade were successful,[1] but those ships fast enough to evade the Union Navy could only carry a small fraction of the supplies needed.[2] These blockade runners were operated largely by British citizens, making use of neutral ports such as Havana, Nassau and Bermuda. The Union commissioned 500 ships, which destroyed or captured about 1,500 blockade runners over the course of the war. Contents [hide] 1 Proclamation of blockade and legal implications 1.1 Recognition of the Confederacy 2 Operations 2.1 Scope 2.2 Blockade service 2.3 Blockade runners 3 Impact on the Confederacy 3.1 Confederate response 4 Major engagements 5 Squadrons 5.1 Atlantic Blockading Squadron 5.2 North Atlantic Blockading Squadron 5.2.1 Commanders 5.3 South Atlantic Blockading Squadron 5.3.1 Commanders 5.4 Gulf Blockading Squadron 5.4.1 Commanders 5.5 East Gulf Blockading Squadron 5.5.1 Commanders 5.6 West Gulf Blockading Squadron 5.6.1 Commanders 6 See also 7 References 8 Bibliography 9 Further reading 10 External links Proclamation of blockade and legal implications[edit] On 19 April 1861, President Lincoln issued a Proclamation of Blockade Against Southern Ports:[3] Whereas an insurrection against the Government of the United States has broken out in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and the laws of the United States for the collection of the revenue cannot be effectually executed therein comformably to that provision of the Constitution which requires duties to be uniform throughout the United States: And whereas a combination of persons engaged in such insurrection, have threatened to grant pretended letters of marque to authorize the bearers thereof to commit assaults on the lives, vessels, and property of good citizens of the country lawfully engaged in commerce on the high seas, and in waters of the United States: And whereas an Executive Proclamation has been already issued, requiring the persons engaged in these disorderly proceedings to desist therefrom, calling out a militia force for the purpose of repressing the same, and convening Congress in extraordinary session, to deliberate and determine thereon: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, with a view to the same purposes before mentioned, and to the protection of the public peace, and the lives and property of quiet and orderly citizens pursuing their lawful occupations, until Congress shall have assembled and deliberated on the said unlawful proceedings, or until the same shall ceased, have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the law of Nations, in such case provided. For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach, or shall attempt to leave either of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the Commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will endorse on her register the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable. And I hereby proclaim and declare that if any person, under the pretended authority of the said States, or under any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the City of Washington, this nineteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. Recognition of the Confederacy[edit] In his Memoirs of Service Afloat, Raphael Semmes contended that the announcement of a blockade carried de facto recognition of the Confederate States of America as an independent national entity since countries do not blockade their own ports but rather close them.[4] Under international law and maritime law, however, nations had the right to stop and search neutral ships in international waters if they were suspected of violating a blockade, something port closures would not allow. In an effort to avoid conflict between the United States and Britain over the searching of British merchant vessels thought to be trading with the Confederacy, the Union needed the privileges of international law that came with the declaration of a blockade. However, by effectively declaring the Confederate States of America to be belligerents —rather than insurrectionists, who under international law were not eligible for recognition by foreign powers— Lincoln opened the way for European powers such as Britain and France to recognize the Confederacy. Britain's proclamation of neutrality was consistent with the Lincoln Administration's position —that under international law the Confederates were belligerents— and helped legitimize the Confederate States of America's national right to obtain loans and buy arms from neutral nations. The British proclamation also formally gave Britain the diplomatic right to discuss openly which side, if any, to support.[1] Operations[edit] Scope[edit] A joint Union military-navy commission, known as the Blockade Strategy Board, was formed to develop plans for seizing key Southern ports to utilize as Union bases of operations to expand the blockade. It first met in June 1861 in Washington, D.C., under the leadership of Captain Samuel F. Du Pont.[5] In the initial phase of the blockade, Union forces concentrated on the Atlantic Coast. The November 1861 capture of Port Royal in South Carolina provided the Federals with an open ocean port and repair and maintenance facilities in good operating condition. It became an early base of operations for further expansion of the blockade along the Atlantic coastline,[6] including the Stone Fleet. Apalachicola, Florida, received Confederate goods traveling down the Chattahoochee River from Columbus, Georgia, and was an early target of Union blockade efforts on Florida's Gulf Coast.[7] Another early prize was Ship Island, which gave the Navy a base from which to patrol the entrances to both the Mississippi River and Mobile Bay. The Navy gradually extended its reach throughout the Gulf of Mexico to the Texas coastline, including Galveston and Sabine Pass.[8] With 3,500 miles (5,600 km) of Confederate coastline and 180 possible ports of entry to patrol, the blockade would be the largest such effort ever attempted. The United States Navy had 42 ships in active service, and another 48 laid up and listed as available as soon as crews could be assembled and trained. Half were sailing ships, some were technologically outdated, most were at the time patrolling distant oceans, one served on Lake Erie and could not be moved into the ocean, and another had gone missing off Hawaii.[9] At the time of the declaration of the blockade, the Union only had three ships suitable for blockade duty. The Navy Department, under the leadership of Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, quickly moved to expand the fleet. U.S. warships patrolling abroad were recalled, a massive shipbuilding program was launched, civilian merchant and passenger ships were purchased for naval service, and captured blockade runners were commissioned into the navy. In 1861, nearly 80 steamers and 60 sailing ships were added to the fleet, and the number of blockading vessels rose to 160. Some 52 more warships were under construction by the end of the year.[10][11] By November 1862, there were 282 steamers and 102 sailing ships.[12] By the end of the war, the Union Navy had grown to a size of 671 ships, making it the largest navy in the world.[13] By the end of 1861, the Navy had grown to 24,000 officers and enlisted men, over 15,000 more than in antebellum service. Four squadrons of ships were deployed, two in the Atlantic and two in the Gulf of Mexico.[14] Blockade service[edit] Blockade service was attractive to Federal seamen and landsmen alike. Blockade station service was considered the most boring job in the war but also the most attractive in terms of potential financial gain. The task was for the fleet to sail back and forth to intercept any blockade runners. More than 50,000 men volunteered for the boring duty, because food and living conditions on ship were much better than the infantry offered, the work was safer, and especially because of the real (albeit small) chance for big money. Captured ships and their cargoes were sold at auction and the proceeds split among the sailors. When Eolus seized the hapless blockade runner Hope off Wilmington, North Carolina, in late 1864, the captain won $13,000 ($196,023 today), the chief engineer $6,700, the seamen more than $1,000 each, and the cabin boy $533, compared to infantry pay of $13 ($196 today) per month.[15] The amount garnered for blockade runners widely varied. While the little Alligator sold for only $50, bagging the Memphis brought in $510,000 ($7,690,149 today) (about what 40 civilian workers could earn in a lifetime of work). In four years, $25 million in prize money was awarded. Blockade runners[edit] The Confederate blockade runner SS Banshee in 1863 While a large proportion of blockade runners did manage to evade the Union ships, as the blockade matured, the type of ship most likely to find success in evading the naval cordon was a small, light ship with a short draft—qualities that facilitated blockade running but were poorly suited to carrying large amounts of heavy weaponry, metals, and other supplies badly needed by the South. To be successful in helping the Confederacy, a blockade runner had to make many trips; eventually, most were captured or sunk. Nonetheless, five out of six attempts to evade the Union blockade were successful. During the war, some 1,500 blockade runners were captured or destroyed.[1] Ordinary freighters were too slow and visible to escape the Navy. The blockade runners therefore relied mainly on new steamships built in Britain with low profiles, shallow draft, and high speed. Their paddle-wheels, driven by steam engines that burned smokeless anthracite coal, could make 17 kn (31 km/h; 20 mph). Because the South lacked sufficient sailors, skippers and shipbuilding capability, the runners were built, commanded and manned by British officers and sailors. Private British investors spent perhaps £50 million on the runners ($250 million in U.S. dollars, equivalent to about $2.5 billion in 2006 dollars). The pay was high: a Royal Navy officer on leave might earn several thousand dollars (in gold) in salary and bonus per round trip, with ordinary seamen earning several hundred dollars. Blockade runner SS A.D. Vance, captured by the Union Navy and recommissioned as Advance The blockade runners were based in the British islands of Bermuda and the Bahamas, or Havana, in Spanish Cuba. The goods they carried were brought to these places by ordinary cargo ships, and loaded onto the runners. The runners then ran the gauntlet between their bases and Confederate ports, some 500–700 mi (800–1,130 km) apart. On each trip, a runner carried several hundred tons of compact, high-value cargo such as cotton, turpentine or tobacco outbound, and rifles, medicine, brandy, lingerie and coffee inbound. Often they also carried mail. They charged from $300 to $1,000 per ton of cargo brought in; two round trips a month would generate perhaps $250,000 in revenue (and $80,000 in wages and expenses). Blockade runners preferred to run past the Union Navy at night, either on moonless nights, before the moon rose, or after it set. As they approached the coastline, the ships showed no lights, and sailors were prohibited from smoking. Likewise, Union warships covered all their lights, except perhaps a faint light on the commander's ship. If a Union warship discovered a blockade runner, it fired signal rockets in the direction of its course to alert other ships. The runners adapted to such tactics by firing their own rockets in different directions to confuse Union warships.[16] In November 1864, a wholesaler in Wilmington asked his agent in the Bahamas to stop sending so much chloroform and instead send "essence of cognac" because that perfume would sell "quite high". Confederate patriots held rich blockade runners in contempt for profiteering on luxuries while the soldiers were in rags. On the other hand, their bravery and initiative were necessary for the nation's survival, and many women in the back country flaunted imported $10 gewgaws and $50 hats as patriotic proof that the "damn yankees" had failed to isolate them from the outer world. The government in Richmond, Virginia, eventually regulated the traffic, requiring half the imports to be munitions; it even purchased and operated some runners on its own account and made sure they loaded vital war goods. By 1864, Lee's soldiers were eating imported meat. Blockade running was reasonably safe for both sides. It was not illegal under international law; captured foreign sailors were released, while Confederates went to prison camps. The ships were unarmed (the weight of cannon would slow them down), so they posed no danger to the Navy warships. One example of the lucrative (and short-lived) nature of the blockade running trade was the ship Banshee, which operated out of Nassau and Bermuda. She was captured on her seventh run into Wilmington, North Carolina, and confiscated by the U.S. Navy for use as a blockading ship. However, at the time of her capture, she had turned a 700% profit for her English owners, who quickly commissioned and built Banshee No. 2, which soon joined the firm's fleet of blockade runners.[17] In May 1865, CSS Lark became the last Confederate ship to slip out of a Southern port and successfully evade the Union blockade when she left Galveston, Texas, for Havana.[18] Impact on the Confederacy[edit] The Union blockade was a powerful weapon that eventually ruined the Southern economy, at the cost of very few lives.[19] The measure of the blockade's success was not the few ships that slipped through, but the thousands that never tried it. Ordinary freighters had no reasonable hope of evading the blockade and stopped calling at Southern ports. The interdiction of coastal traffic meant that long-distance travel depended on the rickety railroad system, which never overcame the devastating impact of the blockade. Throughout the war, the South produced enough food for civilians and soldiers, but it had growing difficulty in moving surpluses to areas of scarcity and famine. Lee's army, at the end of the supply line, nearly always was short of supplies as the war progressed into its final two years. When the blockade began in 1861, it was only partially effective. It has been estimated that only one in ten ships trying to evade the blockade were intercepted. However, the Union Navy gradually increased in size throughout the war, and was able to drastically reduce shipments into Confederate ports. By 1864, one in every three ships attempting to run the blockade were being intercepted.[20] In the final two years of the war, the only ships with a reasonable chance of evading the blockade were blockade runners specifically designed for speed.[21][22] The blockade almost totally choked off Southern cotton exports, which the Confederacy depended on for hard currency. Cotton exports fell 95%, from 10 million bales in the three years prior to the war to just 500,000 bales during the blockade period.[1] The blockade also largely reduced imports of food, medicine, war materials, manufactured goods, and luxury items, resulting in severe shortages and inflation. Shortages of bread led to occasional bread riots in Richmond and other cities, showing that patriotism was not sufficient to satisfy the daily demands of the people. Land routes remained open for cattle drovers, but after the Union seized control of the Mississippi River in summer 1863, it became impossible to ship horses, cattle and swine from Texas and Arkansas to the eastern Confederacy. The blockade was a triumph of the Union Navy and a major factor in winning the war. Confederate response[edit] CSS David engaging New Ironsides on 5 October 1863, during the blockade of Charleston. The Confederacy constructed torpedo boats, tending to be small, fast steam launches equipped with spar torpedoes, to attack the blockading fleet. Some torpedo boats were refitted steam launches; others, such as the CSS David class, were purpose-built. The torpedo boats tried to attack under cover of night by ramming the spar torpedo into the hull of the blockading ship, then backing off and detonating the explosive. The torpedo boats were not very effective and were easily countered by simple measures such as hanging chains over the sides of ships to foul the screws of the torpedo boats, or encircling the ships with wooden booms to trap the torpedoes at a distance. One historically notable naval action was the attack of the CSS H. L. Hunley, a hand-powered submarine launched from Charleston, South Carolina, against Union blockade ships. On the night of 17 February 1864, Hunley attacked Housatonic. The Housatonic sank with the loss of five crew; the Hunley also sank, taking her crew of eight to the bottom. Major engagements[edit] The first victory for the U.S. Navy during the early phases of the blockade occurred on 24 April 1861, when the sloop Cumberland and a small flotilla of support ships began seizing Confederate ships and privateers in the vicinity of Fort Monroe off the Virginia coastline. Within the next two weeks, Flag Officer Garrett J. Pendergrast had captured 16 enemy vessels, serving early notice to the Confederate War Department that the blockade would be effective if extended.[23] Early battles in support of the blockade included the Blockade of the Chesapeake Bay,[24] from May to June 1861, and the Blockade of the Carolina Coast, August–December 1861.[25] Both enabled the Union Navy to gradually extend its blockade southward along the Atlantic seaboard. In early March 1862, the blockade of the James River in Virginia was gravely threatened by the first ironclad, CSS Virginia in the dramatic Battle of Hampton Roads. Only the timely entry of the new Union ironclad Monitor forestalled the threat. Two months later, Virginia and other ships of the James River Squadron were scuttled in response to the Union Army and Navy advances. The port of Savannah, Georgia was effectively sealed by the reduction and surrender of Fort Pulaski on 11 April.[26] The largest Confederate port, New Orleans, Louisiana, was ill-suited to blockade running since the channels could be sealed by the U.S. Navy. From 16–22 April, the major forts below the city, Forts Jackson and St. Philip were bombarded by David Dixon Porter's mortar schooners. On 22 April, Flag Officer David Farragut's fleet cleared a passage through the obstructions. The fleet successfully ran past the forts on the morning of 24 April. This forced the surrender of the forts and New Orleans.[27] The Battle of Mobile Bay on 5 August 1864 closed the last major Confederate port in the Gulf of Mexico. "The Battle of Mobile Bay" by Louis Prang. In December 1864, Union Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles sent a force against Fort Fisher, which protected the Confederate's access to the Atlantic from Wilmington, North Carolina, the last open Confederate port.[28] The first attack failed, but with a change in tactics (and Union generals), the fort fell in January 1865, closing the last major Confederate port. As the Union fleet grew in size, speed and sophistication, more ports came under Federal control. After 1862, only three ports—Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; and Mobile, Alabama—remained open for the 75-100 blockade runners in business. Charleston was shut down by Admiral John A. Dahlgren's South Atlantic Blockading Squadron in 1863. Mobile Bay was captured in August 1864 by Admiral David Farragut. Blockade runners faced an increasing risk of capture— in 1861 and 1862, one sortie in 9 ended in capture; in 1863 and 1864, one in 3. By war's end, imports had been choked to a trickle as the number of captures came to 50% of the sorties. Some 1,100 blockade runners were captured (and another 300 destroyed). British investors frequently made the mistake of reinvesting their profits in the trade; when the war ended they were stuck with useless ships and rapidly depreciating cotton. In the final accounting, perhaps half the investors took a profit, and half a loss. The Union victory at Vicksburg, Mississippi, in July 1863 opened up the Mississippi River and effectively cut off the western Confederacy as a source of troops and supplies. The fall of Fort Fisher and the city of Wilmington, North Carolina, early in 1865 closed the last major port for blockade runners, and in quick succession Richmond was evacuated, the Army of Northern Virginia disintegrated, and General Lee surrendered. Thus, most economists give the Union blockade a prominent role in the outcome of the war. (Elekund, 2004) Squadrons[edit] The Union naval ships enforcing the blockade were divided into squadrons based on their area of operation.[29] Atlantic Blockading Squadron[edit] The Atlantic Blockading Squadron was a unit of the United States Navy created in the early days of the American Civil War to enforce a blockade of the ports of the Confederate States. It was originally formed in 1861 as the Coast Blockading Squadron before being renamed May 17, 1861. It was split the same year for the creation of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron and the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron[edit] The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was based at Hampton Roads, Virginia, and was tasked with coverage of Virginia and North Carolina. Its official range of operation was from the Potomac River to Cape Fear in North Carolina. It was tasked primarily with preventing Confederate ships from supplying troops and with supporting Union troops. It was created when the Atlantic Blockading Squadron was split between the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons on 29 October 1861. After the end of the war, the squadron was merged into the Atlantic Squadron on 25 July 1865.[29] Commanders[edit] Squadron Commander From To Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough 18 September 1861[30] 4 September 1862 Acting Rear Admiral[30] Samuel Phillips Lee 5 September 1862[30] 11 October 1864 Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter 12 October 1864 27 April 1865 Acting Rear Admiral[30] William Radford 28 April 1865[30] 25 July 1865 South Atlantic Blockading Squadron[edit] The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was tasked primarily with preventing Confederate ships from supplying troops and with supporting Union troops operating between Cape Henry in Virginia down to Key West in Florida. It was created when the Atlantic Blockading Squadron was split between the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons on 29 October 1861. After the end of the war, the squadron was merged into the Atlantic Squadron on 25 July 1865. Commanders[edit] Squadron Commander From To Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont 18 September 1861[30] 5 July 1863 Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren 6 July 1863[30] 25 July 1865 Gulf Blockading Squadron[edit] The Gulf Blockading Squadron was a squadron of the United States Navy in the early part of the War, patrolling from Key West to the Mexican border. The squadron was the largest in operation. It was split into the East and West Gulf Blockading Squadrons in early 1862 for more efficiency. Commanders[edit] Squadron Commander From To Flag Officer William Mervine 6 May 1861 21 September 1861 Flag Officer William McKean 22 September 1861 20 January 1862 East Gulf Blockading Squadron[edit] The East Gulf Blockading Squadron, assigned the Florida coast from east of Pensacola to Cape Canaveral, was a minor command.[31] Commanders[edit] Squadron Commander[32] From To Flag Officer William McKean 20 January 1862 3 June 1862 Flag Officer James L. Lardner 4 June 1862 8 December 1862 Acting Rear Admiral Theodorus Bailey 9 December 1862 6 August 1864 Captain Theodore P. Greene (commander pro tem) 7 August 1864 11 October 1864 Acting Rear Admiral Cornelius Stribling 12 October 1864 12 June 1865 West Gulf Blockading Squadron[edit] The West Gulf Blockading Squadron was tasked primarily with preventing Confederate ships from supplying troops and with supporting Union troops along the western half of the Gulf Coast, from the mouth of the Mississippi to the Rio Grande and south, beyond the border with Mexico. It was created early in 1862 when the Gulf Blockading Squadron was split between the East and West. This unit was the main military force deployed by the Union in the capture and brief occupation of Galveston, Texas in 1862. Commanders[edit] Squadron Commander[32] From To Rear Admiral David Farragut 20 January 1862 29 November 1864 Commodore James S. Palmer 30 November 1864 22 February 1865 Acting Rear Admiral Henry K. Thatcher 23 February 1865 12 June 1865 See also[edit] Portal icon American Civil War portal Union Navy Confederate Navy Blockade runners of the American Civil War Blockade mail of the Confederacy Bibliography of American Civil War naval history References[edit] ^ Jump up to: a b c d "Lincoln biography". Americanpresident.org. Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ Wyllie, 2007 p.184 Jump up ^ "History Place". History Place. Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ "Jenkins essay". Wideopenwest.com. Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ Time-Life, page 29. Jump up ^ Time-Life, page 31. Jump up ^ "National Park Service". nps.gov. Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ Dead link Jump up ^ Soley, James Russel, The Blockade and the Cruisers Jump up ^ Davis, Kenneth C.- Don't Know Much About The Civil War. ISBN 0688118143 Jump up ^ "Blockade essays" (PDF). Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ Appletons' annual cyclopaedia and register of important events of the year: 1862. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1863. p. 604. Jump up ^ http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/maritime/navy.htm Jump up ^ Time-Life, page 33. Jump up ^ The Civil War in North Carolina – Google Books. Books.google.com. Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ http://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1861fringe/running.html Jump up ^ Time-Life, page 95. Jump up ^ "Galveston ''Weekly News'', April 26, 1865". Nautarch.tamu.edu. July 3, 2000. Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ Land and Liberty I: A Chronology of ... – Google Books. Books.google.com. Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_american_civil_war09_waratsea.html Jump up ^ Bulloch, James Dunwody (1884). The secret service of the Confederate States in Europe, or, How the Confederate cruisers were equipped. G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York. p. 460. Jump up ^ Merli, Frank J. (1970). Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861-1865. Indiana University Press, Indiana. p. 342. ISBN 0-253-21735-0. Jump up ^ Time-Life, page 24. Jump up ^ "National Park Service". nps.gov. Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ "National Park Service". nps.gov. Retrieved June 8, 2010. Jump up ^ NPS.gov, National Park Service Summary Siege of Fort Pulaski Jump up ^ NPS.gov, National Park Service Summary Battle of Forts Jackson and St. Philips Jump up ^ "Amphibious Warfare: Nineteenth Century". Exwar.org. Retrieved June 8, 2010. ^ Jump up to: a b From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: the ... – Google Books. Books.google.com. Retrieved June 8, 2010. ^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g Civil War Desk Reference, p.550. Jump up ^ Anderson, 1989 p.118 ^ Jump up to: a b Civil War Desk Reference, p.551. Bibliography[edit] Anderson, Bern (1989). By Sea and by River The Naval History of the Civil. Da Capo Press, New York. p. 342. ISBN 978-0-615-17222-4. Url Browning, Robert M., Jr. (1993). From Cape Charles to Cape Fear. The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. University of Alabama Press. p. 472. Url —— (2002). Success is All That Was Expected. The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Washington DC: Brassley's. p. 123. ISBN 1-57488-514-6. Url Buker, George E. (1993). Blockaders, Refugees, and Contrabands: Civil War on Florida's Gulf Coast, 1861–1865. University of Alabama Press. p. 235. Url Coker, P. C., III (1987). Charleston's Maritime Heritage, 1670–1865: An Illustrated History. CokerCraft Press. p. 314. Url Elekund, R.B.; Jackson, M.; J.D., Thornton (2004). The 'Unintended Consequences' of Confederate Trade Legislation. Eastern Economic Journal. p. 123. Fowler, William M. (1990). Under Two Flags: The American Navy in the Civil War. p. 123. ISBN 0-393-02859-3. Greene, Jack, (1998).Ironclads at War Combined Publishing Surdam, David G., (2001).Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War University of South Carolina Press Time-Life Books, (1983)The Blockade: Runners and Raiders. The Civil War series Time-Life Books, ISBN 0-8094-4708-8. Vandiver, Frank Everson, (1947).Confederate Blockade Running Through Bermuda, 1861–1865: Letters And Cargo Manifests, primary documents Wagner, Margaret E., Gallagher, Gary W. and Finkelman, Paul ed.,(2002) The Library of Congress Civil War Desk Reference Simon & Schuster, New York. ISBN 978-1-4391-4884-6 Wise, Stephen R. (1991). Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War. Univ of South Carolina Press. p. 403. ISBN 0-87249-554-X. Url Wyllie, Arthur (2007). The Confederate States Navy. Lulu.com. p. 466. ISBN 978-0-615-17222-4. Url1 Url2 Wynne, Nick & Cranshaw, Joe (2011). Florida Civil War Blockades History Press,Charleston, SC, ISBN 978-1-60949-340-0. Further reading[edit] Calore, Paul (2002). Naval Campaigns of the Civil War. McFarland. p. 232. Url Tucker, Spencer (2010). The Civil War Naval Encyclopedia, Volume 1. ABC-CLIO. p. 829. ISBN 978-1-59884-338-5. Url External links[edit] National Park Service listing of campaigns Book review: Lifeline of the Confederacy Unintended Consequences of Confederate Trade Legislation The Hapless Anaconda: Union Blockade 1861–1865 Sabine Pass and Galveston Were Successful Blockade-Running Ports By W. T. Block Civil War Blockade Organization David G. Surdam, Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War ISBN 1-57003-407-9 "The Egotistigraphy", by John Sanford Barnes. An autobiography, including his Civil War Union Navy service on a ship participating in the blockade, USS Wabash, privately printed 1910. Internet edition edited by Susan Bainbridge Hay 2012 </p> 20227890 2015-04-09 04:36:36 2015-04-09 04:36:36 open open union-blockade-20227890 publish 0 0 post 0 Louis Sheehan Lou Sheehan Darius N. Couch